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THE PROPOSAL FOR REINTERPRETING THE ABM
AGREEMENT: DEATH OF A TREATY
Richard A. De Tar*
INTRODUCTION
On May 26, 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM
Treaty or Treaty).' The Treaty was ratified and entered into force on
October 3, 1972.2 The ABM Treaty was the result of years of difficult
negotiations facilitated by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 3
The drafters of the ABM Treaty believed that negotiating limits on
defensive ABM systems was a step toward constraining offensive sys-
tems.4 Accordingly, the parties to the Treaty agreed not to deploy na-
tionwide ABM systems for the defense of their countries., In this re-
gard, the Treaty has successfully restricted the deployment of an entire
class of American and Soviet weapons that could repel ballistic
missiles."
The Treaty, however, has become the subject of a debate involving
two distinctly different interpretations of its provisions.7 The dispute
* J.D. Candidate, 1989, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972 23
U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
2. CIS Index to Presidential Executive Orders & Proclamations, 1972 (Micro. 29-
18) (Proclamation made by President Nixon on Oct. 3, 1972). The United States Sen-
ate ratified the ABM Treaty by a vote of 88 to 2. 133 CONG. REC. S2976 (daily ed.
Mar. 11, 1987).
3. See E. BoTToME, THE BALANCE OF TERROR 155 (1986) (stating that SALT I
was a two-part agreement, one part of which is the ABM Treaty).
4. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, preamble, 23 U.S.T. 3435, 3437, T.I.A.S. No. 7503
(stating that the treaty would substantially aid reduction in strategic offensive arms).
5. Id. art. 1 (2), 23 U.S.T. 3435, 3438, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
6. Smith, McNamara, Rhinelander and Keeny, Early Dismantlement of the ABM
Treaty, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, March 1987, at 3; see R. GARTOFF, DETENTE AND
CONFRONTATION, 188-89 (1985) (stating that the ABM Treaty has effectively limited
ballistic missile defense).
7. Compare 85 DEP'T STATE BULL. 32, 32-33 (Dec. 1985) (statement of Robert
McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) (announcing in
October 1985 that not only is the previously accepted research of ABM systems per-
mitted under the terms of the ABM Treaty, but future development and testing of
ABM systems, though previously prohibited, is also authorized) with Smith, Ex-Secre-
taries Urge Adherence to ABM Pact, Wash. Post, Mar. 10, 1987, at A7, col. 4 (report-
ing that former secretaries of defense favor a "traditional," or broad, interpretation of
the ABM Treaty prohibitions).
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focuses on the effect of the ABM Treaty on the Strategic Defense Initi-
ative.8 The supporters of the "traditional" interpretation of the Treaty
maintain that the Treaty prohibits development, testing, or deployment
of any space-based, air-based, sea-based, or mobile land-based ABM
systems,9 including those systems contemplated by SDI.10 Conversely,
proponents of the "reinterpretation" of the Treaty, argue that while the
parties are prohibited from developing, testing, or deploying ABM sys-
tems and their components that were in existence at the time the
Treaty was signed, the parties are permitted to develop, test, and de-
ploy ABM systems that were created after the Treaty was signed."
Therefore, because SDI contemplates "future" ABM systems, advo-
cates of the reinterpretation contend that development and testing of
SDI is permitted.
This Comment analyzes the ABM Treaty in light of the debate over
SDI. Part I of this Comment details the evolution of strategic relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union from the emergence of
nuclear weapons to the signing of the ABM Treaty. Part II discusses
SDI, its rationale, and its potential conflict with the ABM Treaty, as
well as its practical limitations. Part III reviews the provisions of the
ABM Treaty with the purpose of the Treaty in mind. It discusses the
statements and subsequent conduct of the parties, analyzes the ABM
Treaty ratification proceedings in the Senate and discloses formerly
classified information contained in the Treaty negotiating record. This
section reveals that the parties intended for the ABM Treaty to pro-
hibit development and testing of both then-current and future ABM
systems.
8. See Brown, Too Much, Too Soon for SDI, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May 1987,
at 2-3 (explaining that SDI is a research program that envisions a three-layered anti-
ballistic missile defense, including a space-based ABM system, designed to protect the
United States from nuclear attack); see also infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text
(explaining SDI in detail).
9. 133 CONG. REC. S6825-26 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Nunn).
The ABM Treaty allows the parties to deploy one fixed, land-based system at each
party's capital city and one fixed, land-based system at one of each party's interconti-
nental ballistic missile (ICBM) sites. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. III, 23 U.S.T.
3435, 3440, T.I.A.S. 7503.
10. Brown, supra note 8, at 2 (explaining that SDI envisions space-based ABM
systems).
11. See Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 1972, 1974-77 (1986) [hereinafter ABM and SDI] (explaining that under the
terms of the Treaty, the parties are only prohibited from developing and testing those
ABM systems in existence at the time of the Treaty's formulation). Reinterpretation
supporters believe that the terms of the Treaty refer only to "current" systems. Id. at




This Comment concludes that the reinterpretation of the ABM
Treaty is a misinterpretation that would incorrectly permit develop-
ment and testing of SDI. The Reagan administration would adopt the
reinterpretation despite scientific recommendations that reject the prob-
able effectiveness of current SDI research. Perhaps more importantly,
adoption of the reinterpretation would not merely alter the ABM
Treaty, it would destroy it.
I. THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION PRE-ABM
TREATY NUCLEAR STRATEGIES
In order to comprehend the importance of the ABM Treaty, it is
essential to understand the development of the military strategies of the
United States and the Soviet Union prior to 1972. In the early 1950s,
the United States developed the first coherent nuclear weapons strat-
egy, termed massive retaliation, in response to the Soviet Union's ac-
quisition of nuclear weapons.1 2 Under this strategy, the United States
threatened to respond to any Soviet military aggression with a massive
nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.1 3 This strategy was effective;
the near United States monopoly on the possession of nuclear weapons
counterbalanced the Soviet Union's sizeable numerical advantage in
conventional arms.14
By the 1960s, however, the Soviet Union had increased its nuclear
arsenal to rival that of the United States. 5 As a result, a new strategy
12. See C. BLACKER & G. DUFFY, INTERNATIONAL ARMs CONTROL: IssuEs AND
AGREEMENTS 201 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing that under the concept of massive retalia-
tion, the United States would respond to Soviet aggression with nuclear force sufficient
to assure the destruction of the Soviet Union). This theory emerged when the United
States realized that because it possessed conventional forces noticeably inferior to those
possessed by the Warsaw Pact nations, it had to rely on nuclear arms to maintain the
status quo. Id. Nuclear deterrence also served as a relatively inexpensive means of neu-
tralizing the imbalance created by the disparity in conventional forces. Id.
13. See E. BOTTOME, supra note 3, at 19, 21 (recognizing that because the United
States had no military alternatives other than atomic weapons to impede Soviet hegem-
ony, the United States would discourage Soviet aggression by maintaining massive re-
taliatory capacity to strike back with nuclear force). But see L. HALLE, THE COLD
WAR As HISTORY 343 (1967) (noting that once the Soviet Union had achieved nuclear
capabilities sufficient to match those of the United States, the defense of European
allies became untenable because the United States would no longer respond to a Soviet
invasion of Western Europe with a nuclear attack when its own cities were now vulner-
able to Soviet nuclear attack).
14. See D. LACKEY, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 42 (1984) (stat-
ing that after the Korean War the United States became reluctant to expand its con-
ventional forces).
15. See id. at 48-49 (detailing the buildup of Soviet forces in the mid-1950s); see
also R. KOLKOWICZ, M. GALLAGHER, B. LAMBETH, THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS
CONTROL: A SUPERPOWER DILEMMA 27 (1970) [hereinafter SUPERPOWER DILEMMA]
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focusing on deterrence emerged, termed Mutually Assured Destruction
(MAD)."6 Under MAD, if each country maintained a nuclear arsenal
sufficient to destroy the other after absorbing a first strike, the situation
would deter either country from resorting to nuclear weapons.'7
Mutually Assured Destruction was effective only if each country
could ensure the "survivability"' 8 of enough of its nuclear arsenal to
expose the other country's population and industry to the "vulnerabil-
ity" 19 of a retaliatory strike. For a short period the advent of interconti-
nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) diminished the ability of either coun-
try to ensure survivability.20  The subsequent development of
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in the early 1960s that
were hard to locate and difficult to destroy, quickly 'reinstated the
survivability of each country's nuclear forces.21
(explaining the shift in Soviet nuclear doctrine to reflect the theory of massive retalia-
tion by increasing its nuclear capabilities while concurrently reducing its conventional
forces).
16. See C. BLACKER & G. DUFFY, supra note 12, at 202-03 (explaining the theory
of mutually assured destruction (MAD) as a strategy based on mutual deterrence
whereby each nation maintains a nuclear arsenal sufficient to inflict unacceptable retal-
iatory damage upon the other nation to such a degree that the other nation would
refrain from aggression); A. JORDAN, W. TAYLOR, JR., AMERICAN NATIONAL SECUR-
ITY: POLICY AND PROCESS 224-25 (1981) (basing mutually assured destruction on the
notion that two adversaries are each assuredly capable of destroying each other, thus,
deterring either party from engaging in a nuclear attack).
17. C. BLACKER & G. DUFFY, supra note 12, at 202-07; see also Panofsky, The
Mutual Hostage Relationship Between America and Russia, 52 FOREIGN AFF. 109,
109 (Oct. 1973) (asserting that this "mutual hostage" relationship created by MAD
deserves credit for having prevented nuclear war).
18. See C. BLACKER & G. DUFFY, supra note 12, at 203 (outlining the concepts of
"survivability" and "vulnerability" as the major requirements to assure the effective-
ness of MAD); Ikle, Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century? 51 FOREIGN AFF.
267, 268 (Jan. 1973) (noting that mutual deterrence requires three conditions to be
effective). The three requirements are: United States nuclear forces designed to retali-
ate against a sudden Soviet first-strike; swift and sure retaliation; equivalent level of
destructive force as the Soviet first-strike. Id. The first element essential to MAD was
survivability. C. BLACKER & G. DUFFY, supra note 12, at 203. If a country did not
ensure that its nuclear arsenal could survive a first strike then it could not retaliate and
therefore would contain no deterrent. Id.
19. C. BLACKER & G. DUFFY, supra note 12, at 203. Theoretically, a country
would launch a first strike if that country was not sufficiently vulnerable to the other
country's retaliatory strike. Id.
20. See id. at 204 (noting that the development of ICBMs to transport nuclear
warheads at high speed greatly reduced the survivability of both sides' nuclear arse-
nals); see also L. HALLE, supra note 13, at 347 (explaining that during the period
following the initial success of the Soviet Union's space program, many experts in the
United States predicted that the Soviet Union possessed the technology to develop a
decisive superiority in ICBMs that would enable the Soviets to disarm the United
States with one strike).
21. C. BLACKER & G. DUFFY, supra note 12, at 204; see Ikle, supra note 18, at
274 (noting that submarines permit retaliation after a massive surprise attack); see
also A. JORDAN & W. TAYLOR JR., supra note 16, at 224 (noting that a submarine-
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After SLBMs guaranteed survivability, the only means available for
either country to achieve strategic superiority was to reduce or elimi-
nate its vulnerability.22 Both the United States and the Soviet Union
attempted to reduce their vulnerability through the development of
more advanced nuclear weapons as well as a substantial increase in the
quantity of nuclear weapons. This strategy resulted in an escalating
arms race during which each country increased its nuclear arsenal
exponentially.2"
During this period, the Soviet Union also embarked on the develop-
ment of the first ballistic missile defense system.24 Consequently, Secre-
tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and various United States strat-
egists advocated that the United States develop an anti-ballistic missile
system (ABM) to keep pace with Soviet advancements in this technol-
ogy.2 5 During the 1960s, the movement of both countries toward ABM
systems prompted deterrence theorists to argue that the proposed inno-
vations would only promote a new arms race and increase the likeli-
hood of nuclear war.26 In the early 1970s, there was a gradual reduc-
launched nuclear force would preserve deterrence because such a force is virtually in-
vulnerable to a first strike). It is debatable as to how effectively SLBMs would actually
function following a nuclear attack because submarines must rely on communications
that would likely be unavailable at the time. Id.
22. See C. BLACKER & G. DUIFFY, supra note 12, at 203 (explaining that if a
country is not vulnerable to nuclear attack then there is no deterrence against the nu-
clear capabilities of an adversary).
23. See generally E. BOTrOME, supra note 3, at 18-69 (describing how the develop-
ment of various weapons systems triggered the development of other systems which
resulted in an escalating arms race in the 1950s and early 1960s). See also D. LACKEY
supra note 14, at 69-70 (dividing the nuclear era into four arms races, each triggered
by the development of new weapons systems and countered by the opposing side).
24. See AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL, USSR vs USA; THE ABM AND THE
CHANGED STRATEGIC MILITARY BALANCE 48 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter USSR vs
USA] (noting that the Soviet Union initiated development of an ABM system in the
1950s). With this development the Soviet Union possessed a strategic program that the
United States feared could eliminate Soviet vulnerability from nuclear attack and
therefore eliminate nuclear deterrence. Id. at 69.
25. C. BLACKER & G. DUFFY, supra note 12, at 206; see USSR vs USA supra
note 24, at 60 (quoting President Richard M. Nixon in 1969 that an American ABM
system was essential for the security of the United States and its allies); R. HARKAVY
& E. KOLODZIEJ, AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY-MAKING 102 (1980) (containing com-
ments made by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967, that the reasons
justifying the deployment of an ABM system was to protect against a Soviet ICBM
attack).
26. See C. BLACKER & G. DUFFY, supra note 12, at 205-10 (noting that deterrence
theorists were uncomfortable with the growing arms race and with research directed
towards defensive systems because both policies threatened to upset the delicate nu-
clear balance and make nuclear war more likely); see also SUPER POWER DILEMA,
supra note 15, at 51 (recognizing that any actions directed toward limiting the damage
from a nuclear war are recognized as upsetting the balance of terror, thereby reducing
the deterrence effect); R. HARKAVY & E. KOLODZIEJ, supra note 25, at 102 (explain-
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27tion of tension between the superpowers. A result of this period of
"detente" was the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which
gave birth to the ABM Treaty. 8
In sum, the ABM Treaty was negotiated with the realization that
the successful deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems could reduce
or eliminate the vulnerability of both countries and thereby remove the
only deterrent that had successfully prevented either superpower from
initiating a nuclear war.29 The Treaty thus "ratifies" the MAD system
in that through its restrictions on defensive systems, it seeks to main-
tain a system of mutual deterrence. 30 Through the preservation of this
"balance of terror", the drafters of the ABM Treaty hoped to avoid the
increasing possibility of nuclear war.
II. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
A. THE ORIGINAL PLAN FOR THE FUTURE
In March of 1983, President Reagan announced plans to develop and
deploy a defensive system designed to protect the United States from a
ballistic missile attack.31 This proposal eventually became known as the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).32 The plan originally proposed vig-
orous research to determine the feasibility of such a defensive system. 33
ing that the advent of ABM systems was perceived as a threat to MAD and that at-
tempts to devise defensive systems resulted in added efforts to produce offensive sys-
tems to overcome them).
27. See E. BOTTOME, supra note 3, at 155 (reporting that many foreign policy ex-
perts thought at the time that d6tente was the beginning of the end of the arms race).
28. A. JORDAN & W. TAYLOR JR., supra note 16, at 225.
29. See C. BLACKER & G. DUFFY supra note 12, at 242 (explaining that the ex-
plicit purpose of the ABM Treaty is to reduce the possibility of nuclear war by ensur-
ing the stability of each nation's deterrent); Keeney and Panofsky, Mad Versus Nuts:
Can Doctrine or Weaponry Remedy the Mutual Hostage Relationship of the Super-
powers?, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 287, 288 (1981) (stating that MAD has so far prevented
world war).
30. A. JORDAN & W. TAYLOR JR., supra note 16, at 225.
31. N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1983, at Al, col. 6; cf. Gates, Deputy Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, The Soviets and SDI, An Address to the World Affairs Council of
Northern California, at 2 (Nov. 25, 1986) (available at the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, Washington, D.C.) (noting that until March of 1983 the United
States developed its nuclear strategy based on the deterrent ability of huge nuclear
arsenals and the vulnerability of each side which insured that any act of nuclear ag-
gression was confronted with equal and indefensible retaliation).
32. Address by Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Se-
curity Affairs, The Strategic Defense Initiative, at 3 (Mar. 7, 1985) (available at The
United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., Cur-
rent Policy No. 670). Research into SDI was intended to determine whether it was
technologically feasible and cost-effective to integrate a defensive system into the
United States nuclear weapons arsenal. Id.
33. Id. The traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty imposes no limits of any
[VOL. 3:419
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The effectiveness of SDI depends on the limits of nuclear technology.
Under one theory, SDI might only protect United States land-based
ballistic missiles, ensuring the survivability of the weapon but not di-
minishing the vulnerability of a nuclear attack.3 Another view of SDI
is that it could potentially provide a defense system impervious to all
ballistic missiles directed against the United States.3s
As of October 15, 1985, the Reagan administration emphasized that
SDI was a research program only and that there were no plans to rein-
terpret the ABM Treaty."6 SDI research was intended to provide future
presidents and Congress with the information necessary to make in-
formed decisions concerning the feasibility and direction of SDI.37 The
program envisioned that SDI would become feasible only when the sys-
tem possessed survivability capabilities during a nuclear attack and be-
came cost effective.
38
kind on research. Id.
34. See Ikle, supra note 18, at 283 (explaining that a defensive system that pro-
tects offensive weapons preserves the survivability of the weapons, thus ensuring that a
country has adequate retaliatory forces; see also Brown, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that
a near-perfect defense of population will not be feasible for decades).
35. Brown, supra note 8, at 2. Brown cautions that the full effectiveness of SDI is
difficult to ascertain while the program is in the research stages. Id.; see also Strategic
Defense Initiative: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Strategic and Theater Nuclear
Forces of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 72 (1985)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of De-
fense) (arguing that the success of SDI depends on diminishing the chances that a
Soviet nuclear strike against the United States will destroy all retaliatory capability).
36. See Address by Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary
of State on Arms Control Matters, SDI: Its Nature and Rationale, at 2 (Oct. 15,
1985) (available at the United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Washington, D.C., Current Policy No. 751) [hereinafter Nitze Address] (noting that
SDI as a research program is permitted under the ABM Treaty); see also Address of
Kenneth Adelman, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, SDI: Setting the Record Straight, at 2 (Aug. 7, 1985) (available at the
United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., Cur-
rent Policy No. 751) (reiterating that SDI is a research program only and that such
research is consistent with United States obligations under the ABM Treaty).
37. See Nitze Address, supra note 36, at 2 (commenting that SDI research will
provide future administrations and members of Congress with the information neces-
sary to decide whether to shift United States military strategy toward a greater empha-
sis on defensive systems than the United States employed in the 1970s and the 19803).
38. See Bunn, Deploying a Disaster, ARM s CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 1987, at 22
(explaining that survivability refers to the ability of SDI to withstand an attack, while
cost effectiveness is achieved when the opposing side can no longer deploy additional
offensive forces to overcome the defenses at equal or less than the cost of providing the
defense). But see Nitze, An Arms Control Agenda that Kissinger Should Know, Wash.
Post, Mar. 30, 1987, at Al 1, col. 3 (cautioning that although great progress has been
made in the research phase, it is still unknown whether the prospective defense would
be survivable or cost-effective). These two concerns have been referred to as the "Nitze
criteria." Bunn, supra, at 22.
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B. EARLY DEPLOYMENT
In 1987 a heated political and scientific debate raged concerning the
relationship between the ABM Treaty and progress concerning SDI.
This debate continues despite admonitions from the scientific commu-
nity that the United States is not ready to move beyond the research
phase in SDI planning"9 and regardless of Reagan administration state-
ments that the United States is only interested in "researching" defen-
sive systems.
4 1
In October of 1985, the Reagan administration presented its reinter-
pretation of the ABM Treaty but vowed to follow the traditional inter-
pretation.4 The reinterpretation maintains that while the ABM Treaty
prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of defensive sys-
tems in existence when the Treaty was signed, it did not prohibit sys-
tems that became feasible after the Treaty was signed.42 Since July
1986, the Reagan administration has based its negotiating position on
an SDI program that is only permitted by a reinterpretation of the
Treaty. 3 Advocates of the reinterpretation, led by State Department
Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer, former Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle,
claim that SDI research has progressed so rapidly that the traditional
interpretation of the ABM Treaty prevents scientists from implement-
ing their discoveries.44
39. See Physicists Say SDI Technology Still Distant, ARMS CONTROL TODAY,
June 1987, at 24-25 [hereinafter Distant Technology] (explaining that members of the
scientific community have determined that it is too early to assess the potential effec-
tiveness of SDI).
40. Cf. Nitze Address, supra note 36, at 2 (noting members of the Reagan admin-
istration arguing correctly that SDI research is permitted under the traditional inter-
pretation of the ABM Treaty).
41. See Keeny, To Redefine the ABM Treaty is to Kill It, L.A. Times, Feb. 15,
1987, at 6, col. 3 (reporting that Secretary of State George Shultz announced that the
Reagan administration would not seek to implement its reinterpretation of the ABM
Treaty without first consulting Congress and the NATO allies); Safire, Get Off the
Floor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1987, at 19, col. 6 (citing the Secretary of Defense as
advocating a narrow interpretation of the prohibitions of the ABM Treaty).
42. ABM and SDI, supra note !1, at 1973.
43. ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, DANGERS OF IMPLEMENTING THE NEW INTER-
PRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY 1, 1 (April 1987) (available at the Arms Control
Association, Washington, D.C., Background Paper). Although the reinterpretation is
not yet official policy, the Reagan administration has taken positions consistent with
the reinterpretation at the Defense and Space talks in Moscow and Reykjavik. Id.; see
also Early Dismantlement of the ABM Treaty, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 1987, at
3 (statement of Spurgeon M. Keeny, president of the Arms Control Association) (quot-
ing Secretary of State George Shultz as saying a final decision could not be made until
the Reagan administration undertook a detailed consultation with Congress and the
NATO Allies).
44. Weinrod and Holmes, Weighing the Evidence: How The ABM Treaty Permits
[VOL. 3:419
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The proposed plan for SDI is to proceed with a three-tier model,
including a space-based component based on future technology.4 The
American Physical Society (APS) concluded, however, that another ten
years of research was necessary to even consider whether a defensive
system based on future technology is feasible. 48 A member of the APS
reviewing panel, Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, stated that the APS study,
basing its conclusions on current technology, revealed that the tradi-
tional interpretation of the Treaty would offer no significant restraints
toward establishing a sound SDI program. 47
III. INTERPRETING THE TREATY
A. TREATY TEXT
According to both international and domestic law, the principal
method of determining the significance of a treaty is to consider the
ordinary meaning of its text.48 Additionally, treaties are correctly eval-
A Strategic Defense System, BACKGROUNDER, THE HERITAGE FOUND. 1, 3-4 (Feb. 26,
1987) (defining the barriers of the restrictive interpretation of the ABM treaty).
45. See Brown, supra note 8, at 2-3 (discussing a three-layer system consisting of a
space-based system using kinetic kill vehicles at the first stage of a missile's flight,
exoatmospheric weapons for the late mid-course phase, and high-altitude en-
doatmospheric weapons for the terminal phase). The Reagan administration envisions
possible deployment of this system by 1993 or 1994. Id.
46. See Distant Technology, supra note 39, at 24-25 (describing the report pre-
pared by a seventeen member panel of the American Physical Society (APS) based in
part upon information gained from the Department of Defense). The panel, including
three Nobel Prize winners, concluded that even in the most optimal circumstances, ten
or more years of intensive research were required to provide the technical knowledge
necessary to evaluate the potential success and survivability of the proposed systems.
Id; see also Smith, Early SDI Deployment Unfeasible. Experts Say, Wash. Post, Apr.
24, 1987, at A16, col. 1 (statement of Kumar Patel, co-chairman of the APS study
group) (arguing that based on scientific and engineering criteria, scientists would not
advocate early deployment of SDI).
47. See Panofsky, A Physicist Evaluates SDI, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, June 1987,
at 26 (stating that much of the current research does not have direct relevance to the
feasibility of a strategic missile defense). Dr. Panofsky also stated that except for pub-
lic relations purposes, there is no reason to discontinue SDI research within the limits
of the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Id. at 26-27.
48. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31 (1), opened for signature
May 23, 1969, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 39/27, reprinted
in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; The Vienna Convention is the
principal international source of authority on the interpretation of treaties. L. HENKIN,
R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, H. SMIT, International Law; Cases and Materials 387 (2d
ed. 1987). Although the United States has not ratified the Convention, the United
States Department of State has recognized it as the foremost authority on treaty law
and practice. Id.; see also Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985) (stating that a
United States court may look at a treaty's history, negotiating record, and practical
construction when interpreting its meaning). The court should focus on the treaty's text
while still seeking the treaty's evident purpose. Id. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 149, comment b (1965) (holding
1988]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
uated in light of objectives and purposes of the parties when the agree-
ment was formulated. 49 This method of appraisal provides the treaty
with clear meaning where the text is otherwise ambiguous or mislead-
ing.50 The purpose of a treaty is examined with regard to the entire
treaty and its intended effect rather than focusing on any single provi-
sion of the treaty in isolation.5'
The text of the ABM Treaty reveals that the purpose of the Treaty
was to eliminate those defensive weapons that could protect either the
United States or the Soviet Union from nuclear attack, thereby upset-
ting the balance of power. 52 The ABM Treaty has thus far prevented
either party from establishing a nationwide defense against strategic
ballistic missiles.53 When considering the language of the Treaty in
light of its purpose, the text substantiates the argument for the tradi-
tional interpretation while it exposes the inconsistencies of the reinter-
pretation. Because a reasonable interpretation of the Treaty prevents
either party from possessing a nationwide defense system, the United
States should adhere to this traditional and reasonable view.
I. Article II
Article II is the first of four disputed provisions in the ABM
Treaty.54 Article II defines an ABM system as one that counters strate-
that under international law, when a national court interprets an international agree-
ment it merely constitutes a unilateral national interpretation).
49. See Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 31 (1) (stating that the purpose of
the treaty is relevant in determining the meaning); see also A. McNAIR, LAW OF
TREATIES 380-81 (1961) [hereinafter A. MCNAIR] (stating that closely connected with
the primary duty of seeking to give effect to the common intentions of the parties is the
duty to consider the overall aim and purpose of the treaty); United States v. Kember,
685 F.2d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (holding that a court
should interpret a treaty based on the intentions of the parties).
50. See A. MCNAIR, supra note 49, at 381 (stating that treaties should be inter-
preted as a whole and not from isolated words and phrases); see also Day v. Trans-
World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976)
(holding that when United States courts interpret a treaty they should provide a mean-
ing for the text of the treaty consistent with the intentions of the parties when formu-
lating the agreement).
51. A. MCNAIR, supra note 49, at 381.
52. C. BLACKER & G. DUFFY, supra note 12, at 242.
53. Chayes & Chayes, Testing and Development of "Exotic" Systems under the
ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1956, 1957 (1986)
(discussing the new interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which focuses on the text of the
treaty as well as the real intent behind the treaty).
54. See id. at 1957-63 (discussing the debate concerning Treaty articles II, III, and
IV and Agreed Statement D); see also A. SOFAER, THE ABM TREATY, PART 1: THE
NEGOTIATING RECORD 6-7 (May 1987) (available at the United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter SOFAER'S NEGOTIATING
RECORD] (outlining the controversial text of the ABM Treaty).
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gic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently con-
sisting of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM ra-
dar. 55 The entire debate hinges on the definition of an ABM system
under article II. Each party has succeeded in applying its own defini-
tion of an "ABM system" to support its position."'
According to the traditional interpretation, article II defines an
"ABM system" functionally to encompass any system designed to
counter strategic ballistic missiles. 57 Supporters of the traditional view
argue that the list of ABM components provided in article II only illus-
trated ABM systems "currently" in existence in 1972.8 These tradi-
tionalists contend that because the listing of components in article II is
only illustrative, the Treaty does not exclude future systems, such as
space-based systems, from the definition of an ABM system.", The defi-
nition thus also includes future ABM systems using components that
are not listed in article II, because they did not exist at the time of the
drafting of the Treaty.
55. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. II, 23 U.S.T. 3437, 3439, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
The text of article II is as follows:
Article II
1. For the purposes of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strate-
gic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and
deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching
ABM interceptor missiles; and
(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or
of a type tested in an ABM mode.





(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
(e) mothballed.
56. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 53, at 1957-63 (providing definition of the
traditional interpretation of an ABM system throughout the Treaty). This interpreta-
tion results in prohibitions on both current and future ABM systems and components.
Id. But see ABM and SDI, supra note 11, at 1973-78 (applying the reinterpretation's
definition of an ABM system throughout the Treaty). The reinterpretation allows for
the development of future ABM systems. Id.
57. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 53, at 1958 (noting that after article 11
defined an ABM system, the parties explicitly listed "current" systems). The list of"current systems" was illustrative rather than exclusive. Id. The definition thus applies
to future ABM systems as well as those in use at the time the Treaty was signed. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 1957-63 (explaining the traditional, or functional, definition of an
ABM system); 133 CONG. REC. S6825 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (remarks of Sen.
Nunn) (arguing that the parties deliberately inserted the word "currently" in the
Treaty text to ensure that the definition was not limited to then-current components).
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Advocates of the reinterpretation argue that article II defines ABM
systems as only those systems that counter strategic ballistic missiles
with ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars.60 Interpreting ar-
ticle II in this literal way results in limiting the definition of an ABM
system to allow for systems using components not specifically listed in
article II.61 From a purely textual perspective this view appears plausi-
ble, yet in light of the purpose of the Treaty it would make little sense
for the parties to have hamstrung the effectiveness of the Treaty
through a gaping loophole in article II that permitted development and
testing of all future defense systems not using the specifically forbidden
interceptor missiles, launchers, or radar.
62
2. Article V(1)
Article V(1) prohibits either party from developing, testing, or de-
ploying sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM
systems."3 The debate involving article V(1) also pivots on the defini-
tion of an ABM system as interpreted under article II.64
Proponents of the traditional view interpret article V(1) as applying
an illustrative definition of an ABM system.6" They maintain that arti-
60. See ABM and SDI, supra note 11, at 1974 (quoting Sofaer as arguing that
article II named specific components to provide an inclusive list of those components
prohibited from future development and testing by the ABM Treaty). But see id.
(noting that Sofaer concedes that although the traditional definition of an ABM system
in article II is "plausible," the traditional interpretation renders other portions of the
Treaty, particularly Agreed Statement D, superfluous). The Chayes' argue that apply-
ing Sofaer's interpretation of article II would be against the Treaty's purposes. Chayes
& Chayes, supra note 53, at 1958.
61. ABM and SDI, supra note 11, at 1974-75.
62. See 133 CONG. REC. S6811 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Nunn) (quoting Harold Brown as explaining that the United States would not have
accepted an agreement that would allow either side to possess an ABM system simply
because the system used components different from those listed under article 11).
63. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. V, 23 U.S.T. 3437, 3441, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
Article V provides:
Article V
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or compo-
nents which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for
launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher,
nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to
develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for
rapid reload of ABM launchers.
Id.
64. See supra note 53, 57 and accompanying text (explaining that the definition of
a ABM system in article II is outcome determinative for either interpretation).
65. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 53, at 1957-58; see 133 CONG. REC. S6825
(daily ed. May 20, 1987) (describing the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty
in terms of article V(1)).
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cle V(1) prohibits all ABM systems, whether those mentioned specifi-
cally in article II or those based on "other physical properties" (future
systems).66 According to this view, article V(1) does not permit devel-
opment, testing, or deployment of any ABM systems, including the
space-based systems envisioned by SDI.
67
In contrast, advocates of the reinterpretation apply the "inclusive"
definition of an ABM system.68 This definition transforms the seem-
ingly illustrative restrictions of article V(1) into prohibitions of only
those systems or components specifically listed in article II..6 Accord-
ingly, supporters of the reinterpretation maintain that article V(1)
would permit SDI's space-based systems. 0
Although the primary significance of article V(1) turns on the defini-
tion of an ABM system, article V(1) also provides independent support
for the traditional interpretation. The plain meaning of article V(1),
particularly when read in light of the purpose of the Treaty, indicates
that the parties are prohibited from developing, testing, or deploying
any space-based ABM system.11 The text in article V(1) therefore
weighs heavily in favor of the traditional view through its independent
definition of the kinds of ABM systems that the Treaty prohibits.
3. Article III
Article III contains the only explicit exception to the ABM Treaty's
prohibitions on the deployment of ABM systems.12 Article III states
66. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (asserting that the definition of "cur-
rent systems" applies to future systems as well).
67. See 133 CONG. REC. S2975 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Nunn)
(explaining the application of the functional definition of an ABM system to article
V(1)). Nunn maintains that the only systems allowed under the Treaty are those fixed
land-based systems described in article III. Id.
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the limited definition of
an ABM system).
69. See ABM and SDI, supra note 11, at 1974 (explaining that application of the
limiting definition of an ABM system results in applying the restrictions of article V(I)
to only those ABM components specifically listed in article II).
70. See Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 28-29 (explaining that,
under the reinterpretationists' definition of an ABM system, article V(I) does not pro-
hibit an SDI system).
71. See 133 CONG. REC. S6825 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Nunn)
(stating that article V(I) prohibits deployment of space-based systems); Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 35, at 231 (statement of John B. Rhinelander) (stating that debates on
the Senate floor during the ratification proceedings on the ABM Treaty show that arti-
cle V(1) was understood to apply to "exotic" space-based systems).
72. See ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. II1, 23 U.S.T. 3437, 3440, T.I.A.S. No.
7503. Article III provides:
Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except
that:
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that each party agrees not to deploy an ABM system except for two
fixed systems, the first deployed around each party's capital city and
the other installed at a specified ICBM silo site. While proponents of
both interpretations agree the language of article III specifically re-
stricts fixed land-based systems, they disagree on the extent of its appli-
cation to other air or space-based systems.
74
Supporters of the traditional interpretation contend that article III
provides the only exception to the Treaty's broad prohibition of ABM
systems .7  Therefore, the traditional interpretation considers the SDI
program a violation of the intent of article III because article III spe-
cifically listed the only ABM systems that were deployable and this
exception did not include space-based systems.
Conversely, because advocates of the reinterpretation apply the defi-
nition of an ABM system that only includes systems using interceptor
missiles, launchers, and radars, they conclude that article III can refer
only to those systems.7 Therefore, advocates of the reinterpretation
reason that article III permits deployment of SDI because article III
(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred
and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may
deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one
hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within
no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular
and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and
(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred
and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy:
(1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred
ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM ra-
dars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under
construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deploy-
ment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM
radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-
mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.
Id.; see also Chayes & Chayes, supra note 53, at 1961 (explaining that article III
contains the only exceptions to the Treaty).
73. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. III. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 53, at
1965 (stating that the purpose of permitting both parties to deploy an ABM system at
one ICBM site is to ensure that each side possesses a retaliatory strike force, thus
preserving MAD).
74. See infra notes 76, 78 and accompanying text (explaining the positions of sup-
porters of each view concerning article III).
75. 133 CONG. REC. S6825 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Nunn).
76. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 53, at 1961-63 (arguing that only those
systems listed in article III are deployable). But see ABM and SDI, supra note 11, at
1973-77 (explaining that the supporters of the reinterpretation do not believe that arti-
cle III prohibits deployment of space-based systems).
77. Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 73 (explaining that, because
supporters of the reinterpretation do not include future systems within the definition of
an ABM system, they do not believe that article III prohibits deployment of those
systems contemplated in SDI).
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does not address future systems. Supporters of the reinterpretation,
however, do not explain why, according to their theory, the drafters
carefully constructed the Treaty to limit current ABM systems yet ne-
glected to restrict, nor even mention, ABM systems utilizing compo-
nents discovered after the Treaty was formulated.78 The only apparent
explanation for this oversight is that the reinterpretation is inherently
inconsistent with the Treaty.
4. Agreed Statement D
Agreed Statement D is one of several statements attached to the
ABM Treaty used to clarify specific points and to remove ambiguity
from the text of the Treaty.7 9 Agreed Statement D reiterates the obli-
gation of each party not to deploy ABM systems except for those per-
mitted under article III.80 Agreed Statement D also states that ABM
systems and substitute components based on "other physical proper-
ties" created in the future are subject to further discussion and
agreement. 81
Supporters of the traditional interpretation maintain that Agreed
Statement D complements article III by providing that if development
and testing leads either party to contemplate deployment of a fixed
land-based system using "exotics," then the parties, pursuant to Agreed
Statement D, must discuss limitations on such deployment.8 2 The tradi-
78. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 53, at 1962 (outlining Sofaer's argument
that the parties did not address limits on future systems until they included Agreed
Statement D in the Treaty).
79. See id. at 1961 (elaborating on the distinctions in Agreed Statement D between
future systems and land-based systems).
80. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, Agreed Statement D, 23 US.T. 3437, 3456
T.I.A.S. No. 7503. Agreed Statement D provides:
Agreed Statements Regarding the Treaty between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems.
[D]
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and
their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties
agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and
including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles,
ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on
such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance
with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.
Id.
81. Id.
82. 133 CoNG. REC. S2975 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn)
(interpreting article III as banning deployment of all "ABM Systems" or their compo-
nents except for two expressly authorized sites and extending article III to ban all
present and future (exotic) ABM systems and components).
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tional view therefore holds that Agreed Statement D pertains only to
the use of exotics in fixed land-based systems.8 3 If the parties fail to
reach agreement on the deployment of fixed land-based systems using
exotics such deployment remains prohibited under the Treaty. 4
Advocates of the reinterpretation rely heavily on Agreed Statement
D to support their position. They maintain that Agreed Statement D
has independent meaning because it is the only section of the ABM
Treaty that expressly mentions exotics.85 Consequently, Agreed State-
ment D is not limited to land-based systems but also refers to future
systems based on "other physical principles." In addition, supporters of
the reinterpretation argue that Agreement D only prohibits deploy-
ment, and that it permits development and testing of systems based on
exotics, including the types of systems envisioned in SDI.8 6 Any deploy-
ment of such systems is subject to discussion and agreement between
the parties.87 Although both positions are possible, it seems unlikely
that the parties would reserve all limitations on future ABM develop-
ments for any agreed statement that followed the substantive provisions
of the Treaty.
B. SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT OF PARTIES
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Vienna Convention) states that the subsequent conduct and practices
of the parties to a treaty is relevant in determining the meaning of that
83. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 53, at 1962; see Senate Hearings, supra note 35,
at 225 (statement of John B. Rhinelander) (commenting that Agreed Statement D
reinforces the prohibitions in articles 1(2) and III on the deployment of fixed land-
based systems).
84. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 53, at 1962 (arguing that the purpose of
Agreed Statement D is to "insure the fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM
systems and their components except as provided in article III of the Treaty"). The
deployments permitted under article III involve limited land-based systems. Id.
85. See ABM and SDI, supra note 11, at 1976 (noting that the text of Agreement
D, unlike the other agreed statements, closely resembles the "operative" terminology
used in the articles of the Treaty). Proponents of reinterpretation, moreover, maintain
that the argument for the traditional view is illogical because it holds that Agreement
D duplicates other parts of the Treaty and therefore Agreed Statement D is meaning-
less. Id.
86. See 133 CONG. REc. S2975 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Nunn) (refuting the reinterpretation argument that because Agreed Statement D only
adresses deployment, it permits testing and development).
87. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, arts. XIII, XIV, 23 U.S.T. 3437, 3444-45, T.I.A.S.
No. 7503. Article XIII provides for a "Standing Consultative Commission" within
which the parties can, among other things, work to amend the Treaty. Id. art. XIII.




treaty.88 United States courts also examine the conduct of parties after
the signing of a treaty to determine the scope of the treaty.89 In this
regard, the subsequent conduct of both the United States and the So-
viet Union support the traditional interpretation.
As of 1985, the United States had not developed or tested a space-
based ABM system using exotics. 0 In October of 1985, Secretary of
State George P. Shultz announced that although the Reagan adminis-
tration espoused the reinterpretation, it would only proceed with re-
searching the feasibility of SDI."1
The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA)92 has also explicitly endorsed the traditional interpretation. In
every Arms Control Impact Statement presented to Congress from
1978 to 1985, the ACDA based its recommendations for SDI spending
in accordance with ABM progress consistent with the traditional inter-
pretation of the Treaty.93 The Agency's fiscal statement for 1985, for
88. See Vienna Convention, supra note 50, art. 31 (3) (b) (providing that when
interpreting a treaty, in addition to analyzing the ordinary meaning of the terms of the
treaty in their context, one shall take into account any subsequent practice of the par-
ties which establishes their agreement); McNAIR, LAW oF TRFIEs 424 (1961) [here-
inafter L. McNAIP] (stating that courts should consider the subsequent conduct of the
parties when determining the parties' intentions under the Treaty).
89. See Saks v. Air France, 724 F.2d 1383, 1385 (1984), rev'd on other grounds,
470 U.S. 392 (1985) (stating in dicta that the court should consider subsequent con-
duct of the parties); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 147 (1) (stating that the practices of the parties subsequent to
the signing of an agreement are taken into account when interpreting it).
90. 133 CONG. REC. S3091 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Nunn)
(stating not only had the United States not developed or tested a space-based ABM
system or any system that would violate the traditional interpretation, but every admin-
istration, including the Reagan administration, has expressly endorsed the traditional
view). The Reagan administration initially implemented SDI planning so that it was
consistent with the traditional restrictions. Id.
91. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (pointing out that while the Rea-
gan administration's position in October of 1985 was to proceed with SDI within the
limits of the traditional interpretation, by July 1986 the Reagan administration's rheto-
ic had shifted to the implementation of an SDI program consistent with the
reinterpretation).
92. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 53, at 1968-69 (explaining that the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency is the administrative agency of the United States
government that monitors arms control progress and reports its findings to Congress
annually); see also Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) (deferring to the
government agency interpretation); Corliss v. United States, 567 F. Supp. 162, 166
(W.D. Ark. 1983) (noting that courts should give great weight to the way in which
government agencies interpret a treaty).
93. See FISCAL YEAR (FY) 1986 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATFiBIENTS, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 225-26 (1985) (stating that the ABM Treaty prohibits development,
testing, and deployment of both current and future ABM systems or components for
such systems including any future technology used for space-based systems); e.g. Fis-
CAL YEAR 1985 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 252
(1984); FISCAL YEAR 1984 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
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example, noted that the ABM Treaty prohibits development, testing,
and deployment of space-based ABM Systems or components for such
systems.9
The United States has never alleged that the Soviets have developed
or tested any space-based system or components using exotics."" More-
over, on October 19, 1985, the Soviet Union, responding to the Reagan
administration's announcement concerning its support for the reinter-
pretation, declared that the Treaty unambiguously prohibited any
ABM system except for those fixed land-based systems allowed under
article Il.98 Advocates of the reinterpretation do not deny that the So-
viets endorse the traditional interpretation. Instead, they argue that the
Soviets never expressed that position until the United States announced
the reinterpretation in October 1985.11
The flaws in this argument are easily exposed. First, there is the ob-
vious explanation that until the United States announced a reinterpre-
tation of the ABM Treaty there was no reason for the Soviets to state
their position. 91 More fundamentally, however, an analysis of Soviet be-
havior exposes the statement as patently untrue.99
On several occasions prior to October of 1985, the Soviets had ex-
pressed their position that the ABM Treaty prohibited development
and testing of any future ABM system.100 In September of 1972, for
example, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V. Kuznetsov stated
266-67 (1983); FISCAL YEAR 1983 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 321 (1982); FISCAL YEAR 1982 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 393-94 (1981); FISCAL YEAR 1981 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATE-
MENTS, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 452 (1980); FISCAL YEAR 1980 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT
STATEMENTS, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 99-100 (1979). Congress requires the ACDA to
present an annual statement concerning recent developments in arms control. 22
U.S.C. § 2590 (1982).
94. FISCAL YEAR 1985 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS, supra note 94, at
252. ACDA has also stated that this prohibition applied to future technology. Id. at
251.
95. 133 CONG. REC. S3091 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
96. Pravda, October 19, 1985, cited in 133 CONG. REC. S2981 (daily ed. Mar. 11,
1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn) (describing the Soviet position espousing the tradi-
tional view).
97. See 133 CONG. REC. S2981 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Nunn) (explaining that the position of the Reagan administration is that the Soviets
publicly supported the traditional interpretation only after the United States an-
nounced its support for the reinterpretation).
98. Garthoff, History Confirms the Traditional Meaning: U.S. and Soviet Subse-
quent Practice under the ABM Treaty, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1987, at 17; 133
CONG. REC. S3094 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
99. See Garthoff, supra note 98, at 16-19 (providing numerous examples prior to





that the ABM Treaty placed an unqualified ban on the development
and testing of exotic ABM systems."0' In 1976, during the SALT II
negotiations, Soviet negotiator Victor Karpov stated that "currently"
was specifically inserted into the text of article II to ensure that the
ABM Treaty would prevent future systems as well as those already in
existence.10 2 On June 4, 1985, Marshall Sergei Akhomeyov published
an article in Pravda in which he argued that the Treaty forbade the
"creation" (development or testing) of space-based ABM systems or
components. 1°3 Careful analysis of the conduct of the Soviet Union sub-
sequent to the adoption of the ABM Treaty, similar to that of the
United States prior to October of 1985, does not suggest that either
party has considered the Treaty to permit the development or testing of
space-based ABM systems using future technology.
C. SENATE RATIFICATION PROCEEDINGS
The Vienna Convention points to ratification proceedings as a means
for interpreting treaties. 104 The United States Senate ratification pro-
ceedings provide important evidence concerning the intentions of the
101. See Garthoff, supra note 98, at 16 (quoting First Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs Vasily V. Kuznetsov as saying that the ABM Treaty resulted in an unqualified
ban on the "creation" of mobile ABM systems).
102. Id. at 17.
103. Akhromeyev, The ABM Treaty - An Obstacle in the Path of the Strategic
Arms Race, Pravda, June 4, 1985, cited in Garthoff, supra note 98, at 19.
104. See Vienna Convention, supra note 48, arts. 31-32 (explaining that it is ap-
propriate to examine ratification proceedings in order to determine the meaning of a
treaty). For example, the subsequent conduct of the parties, including the statements
that they have made, constitutes evidence revealing the meaning of the treaty. Id. art.
31(1)(b). Article 32 provides recourse to supplementary means of interpretation where
a treaty's meaning is in question. Id. art. 32. One such recourse is the ratification
hearings of the United States Senate. id. See also A. SOFAER, Office of the Legal
Advisor, Department of State, THE ABM TREATY PART II: RATiFICATION PROCESS 33
(May 11, 1987) (available at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washing-
ton, D.C.) [hereinafter SOFAER'S RATiFICATION PROCESS] (noting that various scholars
have referred to the Senate ratification proceedings in order to clarify the meaning of a
treaty); L. McNAIR, supra note 88, at 380-81 (explaining that the statements from
parties to a treaty serve as an important guide to understanding the meaning of the
treaty). See Saks v. Air France, 724 F.2d 1383, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds 470 U.S. 392, 400 (1985), on remand 760 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
that a United States court should consider legislative history when interpreting a
treaty); Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429
U.S. 890 (1976) (holding that a court may look to the legislative history to determine
the meaning of a treaty); see also Corliss v. United States, 567 F. Supp. 162, 164
(1983) (stating that when a treaty's text is ambiguous, reference to extraneous infor-
mation is appropriate to determine the intention of the parties). The court in Corliss,
for example, examined a report provided by the Department of State to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations during the ratification proceedings of the Panama Ca-
nal Treaty. Id. at 164-65.
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United States for interpretation of the Treaty through statements made
to the Senate from knowledgeable government officials. 10 These hear-
ings also confirm that the Soviet Union accepted the traditional inter-
pretation of the Treaty. Their position was evident from their failure to
object to statements by United States officials interpreting the Treaty
prohibitions broadly.
10 6
Although Senate discussions rarely distinguished between the devel-
opment of fixed, land-based ABM systems and space-based systems,
where relevant the statements reflected the traditional interpretation,
permitting the former and prohibiting the latter.10 7 During the hear-
ings, for example, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird made the point
that while the ABM Treaty did not bar the use of lasers per se, it did
prohibit such use for space-based ABM systems. 10 8 Others made simi-
lar assertions, including General Paul Ryan, Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, and Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engi-
neering.109 It is also noteworthy that only two Senators voted against
the ABM Treaty,110 one specifically because the Treaty prohibited the
105. See 133 CONG. REC. S2978 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Nunn) (stating that administration officials clearly interpreted the treaty to prohibit
testing and development of mobile space-based ABM systems or components employing
exotics).
106. See Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic
Missiles Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
40 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 Armed Services Hearings] (providing comment from Sen-
ator Goldwater that a member of the Soviet Embassy was present during the Senate
ratification proceedings); cf. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case (U.K. v. Iran) 1952
I.C.J. 92, 105-07 (Judgment of July 22) (criticizing the failure of the British Govern-
ment to object to Iranian legislation that had significant bearing on treaty obligations
between the parties).
107. See 133 CONG. REC. S2976 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1987) (remarks of Sen.
Nunn) (noting that Sofaer fails to identify even one statement in the record in which
any Senator or any Nixon administration official stated that development and testing of
mobile, space-based exotics was permitted).
108. 1972 Armed Services Hearings, supra note 106, at 40-41; see 133 CoNG.
REc. S2977 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn) (explaining that Sec-
retary Laird did not distinguish between the development of fixed, land-based ABMs
and mobile, space-based ABMs). But see SOFAER'S RATIFICATION PROCESS, supra note
104, at 15 (noting that the statement by Secretary Laird is unclear and is considered to
be internally inconsistent). Sofaer, however, does not then try to clarify the meaning of
the statement or provide a different explanation. Id.
109. See 1972 Armed Services Hearings, supra note 106, at 274 (containing a dia-
logue between Senator Henry Jackson and Dr. John Foster). During the testimony
Senator Jackson asserted that the ABM Treaty prohibits the development and testing
of space-based ABM systems. Id. Dr. Foster responded that the United States did not
have a program to develop such a system. Id. Dr. Foster additionally said that the
ABM Treaty permits the development and testing of future ABM components that are
fixed and land-based. Id.
110. 133 CONG. REC. S2979 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
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testing, development, or deployment of space-based systems using fu-
ture technology."' 1
Importantly, supporters of the reinterpretation have failed to reveal
any statements during the ratification proceedings that explicitly en-
dorse the development and testing of space-based exotics under the
ABM Treaty.112 Advocates of the reinterpretation, including Abraham
Sofaer, instead rely on general statements such as those made by Sec-
retary of State Rogers and Ambassador Gerard C. Smith that referred
only to prohibitions on the deployment of future systems.11 3 Sofaer ar-
gues that Rogers and Smith would have also mentioned these restric-
tions as applying to development and testing of future systems had such
restrictions existed.
14
Senator Sam Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee and a leading proponent of the traditional interpretation of
the ABM Treaty, disputes Sofaer's views. Senator Nunn points out
that neither Secretary Rogers nor Ambassador Smith stated that devel-
opment and testing of future systems was prohibited because such de-
velopment and testing is permitted for fixed land-based systems under
article V.115 Senator Nunn states that although Secretary Rogers and
Ambassador Smith did not say that development and testing of mobile
space-based future systems was prohibited, they also did not say it was
permitted.11 6 Nunn also notes that every statement made during the
ratification hearings that distinguishes between fixed land-based sys-
tems and mobile space-based systems supports the traditional
111. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control. International Security
and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 258 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Buckley) (stating that he opposed the ABM agreement because it
would have the effect of preventing the United States from developing a space-based
laser system). Buckley concluded that space-based laser technology was formally ex-
cluded by the ABM Treaty. Id.
112. 133 CONG. REC. S2980 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1987) (statement or Sen. Nunn).
113. See Sofaer's Ratification Process, supra note 104, at 12 (arguing that it is
important that Rogers and Smith make no reference to prohibitions of testing and de-
velopment of future systems).
114. Id. at 12-13.
115. 133 CONG. REc. 52980 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
During the ratification process, every statement that made a distinction between fixed,
land-based systems and other systems supported the traditional view. Id. Furthermore,
it was not illogical for many administration officials to emphasize the Treaty's implica-
tions only as they affected fixed, land-based systems using exotics because those were
the only systems with any meaningful development in 1972. Id.
116. Id. at S2779-80. Nunn argues that simply because Rogers and Smith chose
not to elaborate on specific prohibitions among systems affected by the Treaty and
instead spoke of the Treaty's general restrictions, they did not intend to support any
kind of reinterpretation. Id.
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interpretation. 17
D. NEGOTIATING RECORD
When textual analysis and reference to subsequent statements and
the conduct of the parties to a treaty still leaves a treaty's meaning
ambiguous, the Vienna Convention provides recourse to the negotiating
record. 118 United States courts have also shown a willingness to look at
the negotiating record when interpreting a treaty. 119 The Reagan ad-
ministration's position on interpreting the ABM Treaty is that the text
of the Treaty and subsequent actions of the parties are ambiguous and
that the negotiating record supports the reinterpretation. 20
Amidst the controversy surrounding the meaning of the ABM
Treaty, in 1985 the Reagan administration began researching the
ABM Treaty and its history extensively with the intention of clarifying
its meaning.' 21 In May of 1987, the Reagan administration declassified
the negotiating report prepared by Abraham Sofaer as well as a num-
ber of "memcons" and "cables" from the negotiating sessions that al-
legedly supported the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty.12 2 In re-
117. Id. at S2980.
118. See Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 32 (indicating that it is appropri-
ate to use the negotiating record to confirm the meaning of a treaty where normal rules
of interpretation result in ambiguity or in a particularly unreasonable interpretation);
see also L. McNAIR, supra note 88, at 412 (1961) (explaining that in international
disputes parties often introduce preparatory work as evidence of the true meaning of a
treaty).
119. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 400 (1985) (holding that the negotiat-
ing record is an appropriate source to use to interpret a treaty); Nielson v. Johnson 279
U.S. 47, 52 (1929) (holding that when a treaty's meaning is uncertain, one may con-
sider the negotiations and diplomatic correspondence of the contracting parties); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 147(c) (stating that the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of an
agreement are relevant in determining the meaning of a treaty).
120. See Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 3 (stating that the text of
the ABM Treaty is ambiguous and that the negotiating record suggests that the Soviet
Union refused to ban testing and development of mobile ABM devices based on other
physical principles); see also Chayes & Chayes, supra note 53, at 1956 n.1 (discussing
Robert McFarlane's statement, in October of 1985, that the ABM Treaty does not
prohibit research, development, or testing of systems based on new physical concepts
and noting Secretary of State Shultz's remarks, in October of 1985, that President
Reagan had decided as a matter of policy to follow the traditional interpretation, al-
though the new interpretation was fully justified). But see supra note 45 and accompa-
nying text (noting how the Reagan administration plans to apply the "changed" inter-
pretation to allow full-scale development and testing of defense systems in space).
121. Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 2. Since 1985, the executive
branch has espoused the reinterpretation relying primarily on the classified negotiating
record to support its position. Id. at 3.
122. See id., title page (stating that the negotiating record was released to the pub-
lic on May 13, 1987); 133 CONG. REC. S6810 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of
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sponse to the declassified report, Senator Nunn delivered a public
address in the Senate, based on the recently declassified negotiating
information, and concluded that it offered support for the traditional
interpretation. 23 Indeed, the available negotiating materials, while not
entirely clear due to their informal and disjoined character, support the
traditional interpretation. 24
Sofaer, in his argument for the reinterpretation, concedes that the
President "allowed" the United States negotiators in 1972 to seek re-
strictions on future systems. 25 Sofaer makes this concession in light of
National Security Directive Memorandum No. 127 (NSDM 127), an
instruction from the President to the negotiators informing them to
seek a treaty formulation that would avoid circumvention by future
ABM systems.126 Sofaer, however, cites this instruction as a limitation
Sen. Nunn) (noting that the negotiating record consists of a collection of cables, inter-
national working documents, prepared talking points, memoranda of conversations
(memons) and National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs)). Nunn also states
that the documents are of unequal interpretative value emphasizing that the NSDMs
are most authoritative, codifying the President's official instructions to the United
States delegation. Id. This Comment cites these memcons and notes according to the
form of citation used by Nunn and Sofaer, Airgram-number [hereinafter A-number].
See Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 13 (providing a citation to these
memcons and adopting the "A-number" form as the appropriate form of citation). Due
to the formerly classified status of the negotiating record and its recent availability,
there are only two public reports in existence, a report from Senator Nunn and one
from Abraham Sofaer. This Comment therefore relies significantly on these two reports
when discussing the negotiating history.
123. 133 CONG. REC. S6824 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn)
(stating that although the negotiating record is unclear, it contains enough evidence to
conclude that the ABM Treaty bans deployment of future systems). Nunn also notes
that in a situation where the United States Senate, the majority of the negotiators to
the Treaty, and four successive presidential administrations have upheld the traditional
view, the burden of proof is on supporters of the reinterpretation to show that the
traditional view is incorrect. Id. Nunn concludes that the burden is not satisfied by
reliance on the negotiating record. Id.
124. See id. (statement of Sen. Nunn). Nunn concludes that the preponderance of
evidence in the negotiating record supports the traditional interpretation. Id. But see
Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 3 (concluding that the negotiating rec-
ord resolves the ambiguity of the Treaty in favor of the reinterpretation).
125. See id. at 18-19 (discussing Sofaer's interpretation of NSDM 127, described
below); see also Address by Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and the
Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters, Interpreting the ABM Treaty, at 2
(April 1, 1987) (available at the Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Wash-
ington, D.C., Current Policy No. 936) (stating that United States negotiators sought to
regulate then-current and substitute components). NSDM 127 was a presidential direc-
tive sent to the United States negotiators outlining executive instructions regarding fu-
ture ABM systems. 133 CONG. REc. S6812-13 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of
Sen. Nunn).
126. Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 18-19. Sofaer also quoted part
of NSDM 127 as evidence indicating that the President intended to handle any future
problems arising from the ABM Treaty through the joint commission and the formal
review procedures established by articles XIII and XIV of the Treaty. Id. See supra
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that the President imposed on the liberty of the negotiators to secure
restrictions on future systems and notes that it also directed the delega-
tion to refrain from a detailed discussion of future systems. 117 Sofaer
asserts that the President's instruction was a compromise, neither re-
jecting a ban on future ABM systems nor permitting it to jeopardize
negotiations on the practical objectives of the ABM Treaty.128 Sofaer
also concludes that future systems were not restricted because the
negotiators were instructed not to press on this issue because the Sovi-
ets were unwilling to address it.
129
Sofaer's explanation, while plausible, ignores much of the informal
but valuable information contained in the negotiating record that ex-
plains the unfolding of an ABM Treaty that eventually prohibited the
development, testing, and deployment of future ABM systems."30 The
materials reveal, for example, that the President sought to avoid de-
tailed discussions on future systems because the United States was re-
luctant to reveal too much information about United States military
research.13 The President thus instructed the United States delegation
to settle for a less explicit provision on exotics than was desirable in
return for maintaining secrecy for research.1
3 2
note 87 (describing articles XIII and XIV).
127. See Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 18-19 (noting that NSDM
127 also instructed the negotiators to not invite detailed discussions of future systems).
128. See id. (noting Sofaer's conclusion that the instructions in NSDM 127 were to
accommodate those who argued for securing restrictions on future systems without per-
mitting the issue of future systems to hinder the course of negotiations).
129. See id. at 21 (stating that the Soviets would not discuss future possibilities
with respect to ABM systems). Sofaer provided additional statements implying that the
concept of restricting future systems was abandoned because the Soviets were not will-
ing to discuss future systems and because NSDM 127 instructed the United States
negotiators not to insist on that issue at the expense of the negotiations. Id. at 18-23.
130. See 133 CONG. REC. S6813 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Nunn) (arguing that Sofaer's oversights reveal that the intent of NSDM 127 was to
instruct the negotiators to bargain for restrictions on future ABM systems).
131. See 133 CONG. REC. S6813 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Nunn) (noting that at the time sensitive military research was underway concerning
lasers and particle beam weapons). United States negotiator Sidney Graybeal ex-
plained that he was in a "Catch 22" situation because he was supposed to reach an
agreement on future systems but if he gave details he was "going to catch hell." Inter-
view by Senator Nunn with Sidney Graybeal, United States Negotiator to the ABM
Treaty, Feb. 4, 1987, cited in 133 CONG. REc. S6813 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (state-
ment of Sen. Nunn) [hereinafter Graybeal interview].
132. 133 CONG. REc. S6813 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
The Soviet Union's initial hesitation regarding prohibitions against exotics is explained
because they wanted to discover as much as possible about United States military pro-
grams in this highly classified area. See A-398, cited in 133 CoNG. REc. 56812 n.65
(daily ed. May, 20, 1987) (stating that contrary to Sofaer's claim, Soviet delegate aca-
demician Shchukin did not indicate "that the parties should not attempt to deal with
future possibilities"). What Shchukin said was that there might be some difficulty in
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The negotiating record on specific provisions of the ABM Treaty also
supports the traditional interpretation. Had the parties intended to ex-
clude future systems from the prohibitions of the Treaty, the record
would surely reflect this. As the following discussion of the specific
Treaty provisions discloses, the negotiating record fails to support the
reinterpretation.
1. Article 1I
In December of 1971, the parties agreed on the final version of arti-
cle 11.133 The reinterpretation, relying on Sofaer's analysis of the nego-
tiating record, alleges that the Soviets agreed to add the phrase "cur-
rently consisting of" to article II only after the United States assured
them that the parties would settle questions regarding constraints on
future systems elsewhere.13 4 Although the United States did provide
this assurance to the Soviets, this fact can be explained as consistent
with the traditional interpretation of the Treaty.
Article II merely defines an ABM system and does not impose any
independent constraints. It is article V(l) that addresses the substan-
tive obligations of the Treaty. 35 Therefore, the fact that the Soviets
getting the politicians and diplomats to consider this problem because if one could not
point to specific systems in or near development, the politicians and diplomats would
probably not be interested in future possibilities. Id.; see also id. at S6812 (noting that
Soviet negotiator Victor Karpov reinforced this Soviet theme, stating that if the United
States believes that systems exist it should identify and name them so that the possibili-
ties to limit them could become clearer). The Soviets also feared that the United States
would seek prohibitions sweeping enough to include the Soviet air defense network. See
A-647, cited in 133 CONG. REC. S6813 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Nunn) (noting that the Soviets were concerned that the language of United States
proposals was so broad that it could apply to elements of the Soviet air defense net-
work, especially surface-to-air missiles and air defense radar). The United States pro-
posal on exotics also appeared to have surprised the Soviets. Graybeal Interview, supra
note 131, at 56813. Graybeal states that initially Karpov apparently had no instruc-
tions as to how to reply to new United States proposals on exotics. Id. In Graybeal's
view, once the Soviet delegation received direction from Moscow regarding mobile
space-based exotics, agreement was quickly reached. Id.
133. Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 44. The Soviet negotiators
agreed to this language because it alleviated their concern that its adoption would be
interpreted as Soviet agreement to restrictions on substitute devices elsewhere in the
Treaty text. Id.
134. See id. at 45 (noting that the Soviet negotiators explicitly communicated their
position that they did not interpret article II as resolving the issue of constraints on
future systems); see also 133 CONG. REc. S6820 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (stating
that the Soviets agreed to the change in article II language only after Raymond
Garthoff assured them that the question of constraints would be settled elsewhere).
135. See A-540, cited in 133 CONG. REC. S6813 n.74-76 (daily ed. May 20, 1987)
(statement of Sen. Nunn) (containing a passage in which the leading Soviet negotiator,
Victor Karpov, stated that article II imposed no obligations as to future systems else-
where in the Treaty but that this did not mean that the parties could not reach an
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agreed to the phrase "currently consisting of" in article II only means
that discussions of future systems were to take place elsewhere.
The reinterpretation's advocates also note that the Soviets accepted
the change in article II only after the United States delegation agreed
to drop article V(3) from the original Treaty draft.136 Sofaer argues
that this proves that the Soviets agreed to the final form of article II
only after it was made clear that its adoption would not represent an
agreement that other Treaty provisions would restrict ABM systems
based on "other physical principles."'13 The reinterpretation's advo-
cates draw this conclusion despite additional negotiations that reveal
that the United States preserved this point elsewhere in the Treaty.138
In support of the traditional interpretation, the negotiating record
reveals that the United States withdrawal of article V(3) was contin-
gent upon a clear understanding in the form of an agreed minute.139
That agreed minute eventually became Agreed Statement D.240 This is
important because, contrary to Sofaer's theory, the ABM Treaty did
contain a provision making reference to substitute devices based on
other physical principles.' 4'
Finally, it is worthwhile to note the views of the legal advisor to the
United States delegation, John Rhinelander. Rhinelander prepared a
series of memos during the last five months of negotiation, providing an
analysis of each article of the ABM Treaty.14 2 In his final memo of
agreement concerning future systems in another part of the Treaty). Karpov then
added that article V was one such place where the parties might add an additional
obligation. Id. Additionally, the Soviets must have believed that adding the phrase
"currently consisting of" to article II changed the definition of an ABM system to
include future ABM systems because the change in article II represented a delicate
and controversial issue within the Soviet delegation. Id.
136. See A-677, cited in 133 CONG. REC. 56821 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (state-
ment of Sen. Nunn) (noting that United States negotiator Raymond Garthoff said that
it was the United States position that withdrawal of article V(3) was contingent on a
"clear understanding" in the form of an Agreed Minute. This did not mean that the
United States would retreat from its position that fixed, land-based ABM systems us-
ing exotics would not be deployed. Id.
137. Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 45.
138. See infra note 140 (explaining that the content of article V(3) eventually be-
came Agreed Statement D).
139. 133 CONG. REC. S6821 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
140. See 133 CONG. REc. S6821 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Nunn) (noting that instead of retreating from its position expressed in article V(3) that
fixed land-based systems using exotics should not be deployed, the United States
agreed to incorporate the point in Agreed Statement D).
141. See ABM Treaty, supra note 1, Agreed Statement D 23 U.S.T. 3456,
T.I.A.S. No. 7503 (containing the text of Agreed Statement D). Agreed Statement D
contains a provision that refers to substitute devices. Id.
142. See 133 CONG. REC. S6818-20 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Nunn) (observing that John Rhinelander prepared a series of memos to keep the Presi-
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May 24, 1972, just two days before the signing of the Treaty, Rhine-
lander explicitly defined an ABM System to include future systems
based on physical principles other than those used for current ABM
components.1 43 This unambiguous statement from the legal advisor to
the United States delegation is irrefutable short of insisting that the
United States legal advisor did not understand the correct definition of
an ABM System.
2. Article V(1)
Proponents of the reinterpretation construe article V(l) as referring
only to future versions of ABM components existing in 1972, rather
than including wholly future components. 4 The negotiating record,
however, reveals that the lead Soviet negotiator of article V, Victor
Karpov, stated that article V took into account the intention of the
United States to prohibit the use of future systems as well. 45 The sup-
porters of the reinterpretation also argue that there is a semantic dis-
tinction between "devices" and "systems and components" that ren-
dered article V(1) superfluous as applied to future exotic systems.146
The argument is that because article V(1) included ABM "systems or
components" and not "devices," it must not apply to mobile space-
based exotics.147 Statements of United States and Soviet negotiators,
however, confirm that both sides included exotics within the term ABM
"systems and components."'' 48
dent informed of the negotiations).
143. Rhinelander, Article by Article Analysis of the ABAM Treaty, at No.4 (May
24, 1972), cited in 133 CONG. REC. S6821-22 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of
Sen. Nunn).
144. See 133 CONG. REc. S6815 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Nunn) (arguing that the Soviet Union was not willing to accept limitations pertaining
to components other than those then in use).
145. See A-540, (Sept. 13, 1971), cited in 133 CONG. REC. S6814, n.50 (daily ed.
May 20, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Nunn) (discussing the United States and the Soviet
Union's decisions with respect to article V(I) occurring during September 15-24, 1971,
and noting Karpov's affirmation that article V(I) referred to present and future compo-
nents of ABM systems); A-503, (Sept. 15, 1971) supra note 148 cited in 133 CoNG.
REC. S6814 n.53 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Nunn) (quoting Karpov's
suggestion that the negotiators should eliminate specific listings of ABM system com-
ponents then in use from the Treaty language because the new formulation of article
V(1) obviated its use).
146. See Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 26 (explaining that ABM
interceptor missiles, launchers, and radar were equated with components while replace-
ments for these components, for example, lasers, were referred to as devices).
147. See id. at 32 (claiming that the use of the word "components" in article V(1)
revealed the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to regulate anything other than systems
or components known and then existing).
148. See 133 CoNG. REC. S6815-16 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
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Once again, John Rhinelander's views are revealing. 149 Although
Sofaer has cited Rhinelander's analysis at great length to show that the
ABM Treaty permits the development and testing of mobile space-
based exotics, 150 Sofaer avoids any reference to Rhinelander's final
draft of January 24, 1972, in which he states that article V(1) prohibits
the development of any ABM system or component, with the exception
of those permitted by article III.151 The final version of Rhinelander's
analysis clearly endorses the traditional interpretation. 15
Nunn) (noting statements from United States negotiators' Brown, Smith, and Graybeal
where they used the words "future components," "future devices," and other terms
interchangeably when referring to future systems that used components other than
launchers, missiles, or radar). Nunn also took note of comments from Soviet represent-
atives Trusov and Karpov where they used the terms "devices" and "components" in-
terchangeably in discussions. Id. The reinterpretation argument also contradicts the
reinterpretation argument regarding Agreed Statement D by claiming that Agreed
Statement D represents the only provision in the Treaty limiting exotics. See ABM and
SDI, supra note 11, at 1975 (arguing that Agreed Statement D is the only provision
that refers to exotics and that the Treaty allows for their development). The word
"devices," used by Sofaer to address future systems, does not, however, appear in
Agreed Statement D. See 133 CONG. REC. S6811 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement
of Sen. Nunn) (stating that the term "devices" does not appear in Agreed Statement D
although the supporters of reinterpretation argue that Agreed Statement D is the part
of the Treaty that deals with exotics).
149. See id. at S6818-19 (stating that Rhinelander, the Legal Adviser to the
United States delegation, prepared a series of memos during the negotiations). Each
memo prepared by the Legal Advisor consisted of two parts. Id. The first part set forth
the developing text; where discord remained, the wording was bracketed. Id. The sec-
ond part of the memo consisted of definitive explanations, interpretations, and descrip-
tions with the brackets removed when the delegations mutually assented to the com-
mentary. Id.
150. See Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 66-68, 72 (noting the
bracketed areas of Rhinelander's analysis where reference was made to "devices" and
to any obligations as to future systems using components already defined in the Treaty,
with the exception of article III's limitations). For example, Sofaer acknowledged that
Rhinelander used brackets in his draft of January 24, 1972 and he noted the use of
brackets where a paragraph to state that article V(1) applied to any device that would
perform the function of an existing component. Id; see 133 CONG. Rac. S6819 (daily
ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn) (addressing Rhinelander's memo of Feb-
ruary 24, 1972 where Sofaer suggested that a footnote in the memo of January 24,
1972 indicated that the United States and the Soviet Union were not in agreement with
respect to the application of article V(1) to exotics).
151. 133 CONG. REC. S6818 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
But see Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 66 (explaining that Rhine-
lander modified his January 24, 1972 draft on February 16, 1972 when he bracketed
both the portion of his analysis on article V(I) that dealt with conventional components
as well as the paragraph that stated that article V(1) applies to any "device" capable
of performing the function of a conventional component).
152. See Rhinelander, Article by Article Analysis of the ABM Treaty, May 24,
1974, cited in 133 CONG. REC. S6823 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Nunn) (stating that Rhinelander's final memo supported the traditional restrictions
and all brackets were removed). But see Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54,




The reinterpretation's supporters argue that article III permits lim-
ited deployment of those components specifically listed in article II,
while neither permitting nor restricting deployment of substitute sys-
tems or components, including space-based exotics. 53 Sofaer's reason-
ing for this conclusion is that article III does not expressly prohibit
"substitute" systems for then existing systems or components.1 This is
an unrealistic conclusion in light of the clear prohibition of such substi-
tutes contained elsewhere in the negotiating record. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union agreed that article III permitted the lim-
ited deployment of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and
ABM radar, but not the deployment of substitutes that could perform
their functions.155 Article III clearly prohibits the deployment of substi-
ysis of article V(I) dealing with future systems as well as the accompanying footnote
without any explanation for the change). Cf. 133 CONG. REC. S6824 (daily ed. May
20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn) (declaring that Sofaer's argument lacked
consistency).
153. See Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 56 (arguing that article 1I
pertained only to ABM systems then in existence and therefore that article Ill referred
only to those systems).
154. See ABM and SDI, supra note 11, at 1977 (conceding that some portions of
the negotiating record support the traditional interpretation of article Ill). Sofaer, how-
ever, then expressed doubts about the traditional interpretation and offered an alterna-
tive interpretation without providing any support from the relevant portion of the nego-
tiating record. Id.
On January 31, 1972, United States negotiator Raymond L. Garthoff handed his
Soviet counterparts a five-point paper summarizing what the United States hoped were
mutual points of agreement as to future systems. A-763 (April 28, 1972), cited in 133
CONG. REc. 56821 n.137 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn) (discuss-
ing Garthoffs five points and noting that these points established a mutually agreed
upon framework for Agreed Statement D). Point four asserted that article IllI was to
permit deployment of specified ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM
radars but not substitutes for these systems. Id. The Soviets agreed to Point Four. See
id. (noting that the memcon of the January 31, 1972 meeting states that Point Four
met with no opposition when presented to the Soviet delegation). Nunn also explained
that on April 28, 1972, Oleg Grinevsky, the Soviet official appointed to reach an accord
on this position ad referendum to the full delegation, confirmed Garthofrs interpreta-
tion of article III. Id. This interpretation modified the lead-in clause to article II such
that it would prevent deployment of all ABM systems except for specified fixed land-
based systems using then current ABM components. Id. Nunn's remarks also quoted
Ambassador Parson's memcon of April 28, that stated "[Grinevsky] was saying that
they could agree to a formulation undertaking not to deploy ABM systems or their
components except as the Treaty would provide." Id. On February 1. 1972, United
States and Soviet negotiators Allison and Trusov agreed that the text of article Ill
would ban an ABM system using components other than those listed in article III. Id.
155. See A-766 (February 1, 1972), cited in 133 CONG. REC. S6822, n.145 (daily
ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn) (noting Allison's statement that substitut-
ing a replacement component in the future for an ABM missile, launcher, or radar
would create a "future" or "other" ABM System and that Soviet delegate Trusov
agreed with this statement).
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tute components. 156
4. Agreed Statement D
Advocates of the reinterpretation contend that Agreed Statement D
is the only provision in the Treaty that addresses exotics and that it
only prohibits deployment while development and testing are permit-
ted.117 Sofaer argues that without such an interpretation, Agreed State-
ment D merely is a restatement of article III's ban on the deployment
of exotics' 58 and a summary of procedures detailed at length in articles
XIII and XIV for discussing and agreeing on Treaty amendments. 15 9
Sofaer attempts to substantiate his argument with statements con-
tained in the negotiating record indicating the Soviet Union's willing-
ness to discuss future ABM systems.16 °
Sofaer's argument fails when evaluated in light of the chronological
order of the negotiations and the proper context of the statements he
cites. Agreed Statement D was negotiated and agreed upon before arti-
cle III was completed.16 ' The formulation of Agreed Statement D took
place during a period in the negotiations when the parties had already
agreed to ban the development, testing, and deployment of all mobile
ABM systems but had not yet agreed on the limits on fixed land-based
systems.
16 2
Additionally, there are statements from both Soviet and United
156. See id. at S6822 (recounting Rhinelander's January 24, 1972 memo stating
that article III would permit deployment of an ABM system employing only ABM
launchers, ABM missiles, or ABM radars and also acknowledging Rhinelander's
memos of February 16, 1972, asserting the same proposition). Nunn also discusses
Sofaer's assertion that Rhinelander derived his conclusions from a combined analysis of
article III and Agreed Statement D. Id. Nunn points out that Sofaer does not substan-
tiate his assertion with any authority other than his theory that only Agreed Statement
D prohibits deployment. Id.
157. See supra note 85 (discussing the reinterpretation's view of Agreed Statement
D).
158. ABM and SDI, supra note 11, at 1975-76.
159. Id. at 1977.
160. Sofaer's Negotiating Record, supra note 54, at 54.
161. See 133 CONG. REc. S6823 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Nunn) (noting that the parties did not agree to the text of article III until May 12,
1972). During the negotiations, the parties could not maintain a consensus as to the
scope of the prohibitions in article III or its applicability to future ABM systems or
components. Id.
162. 133 CONG. REC. S6823 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
Even if Agreed Statement D generally reiterates article III's restriction, it was not
redundant to article III at the time, nor was it possible to change the language of
article III due to the short time remaining before the signing of the Treaty. Id. Article
III was agreed upon less than two weeks before President Richard M. Nixon and So-
viet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev were scheduled to sign the ABM Treaty. Id.
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States negotiators that link Agreed Statement D to the limits on fixed
land-based ABM systems found in article 111.163 The Soviet negotiators
stated that the Soviet Union agreed with the United States position on
the subject of exotics and wished to include a joint agreement on the
issue."" This understanding became Agreed Statement D.
CONCLUSION
The ABM Treaty is a delicate commitment. It is an agreement easily
breached with potentially far-reaching implications. Breaches, however,
are not quickly forgotten nor are new agreements readily drafted. In-
ternational law, United States national security, and world stability de-
mand a good faith interpretation of the ABM Treaty free of breach by
either party.
The reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty is an attempt to manipulate
the Treaty to allow for SDI development, testing, and eventual deploy-
ment. However, the text of the ABM Treaty unambiguously states that
the parties shall not develop, test, or deploy ABM systems with the
exception of those permitted by article III. Further, the subsequent
conduct and statements of the parties unequivocally endorse the tradi-
tional interpretation. Six former secretaries of defense and the over-
whelming majority of the United States ABM negotiators have en-
dorsed the traditional interpretation.165 Even the negotiating record,
163. See A-619, (December 7, 1971), cited in 133 CONG. REC. 56823 n.158 (daily
ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn) (citing Soviet delegate Kishlov's state-
ment urging that the parties include some explanation of the difference over limits on
fixed land-based systems contained in article IIl and in article V); see also A-647
(Dec. 14, 1971), cited in 133 CONG. REC. 56823 n.159 (daily ed. May 20, 1987)
(statement of Sen. Nunn) (referring to a statement from Soviet negotiator Shchukin
discussing provisions for components based on new technology that could substitute for
those restricted in article III.) Shehukin proposed that the decision to provide substi-
tutes for the components limited under article III be a matter to refer to the standing
committee who would seek agreement to avoid circumvention of the limits of article
III. Id.
164. A-743, (January 26, 1972), cited in 133 CONG. REC. 56824 (daily ed. May
20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn); See also id. (explaining Grinevsky's statement
that the Soviets accepted the position of the United States as strong support for the
traditional interpretation because the position of the United States distinguished among
different types of exotics). The United States position banned the development, testing,
and deployment of all mobile systems while only restricting the deployment of fixed
land-based ABM systems. Id. Rhinelander also considered Agreed Statement D to be
an explicit explanation of the scope of article III with respect to exotics. See 133
CONG. REc. S6824 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn) (noting that
Rhinelander consistently placed Agreed Statement D within the context of article III
that dealt exclusively with fixed land-based systems and that Agreed Statement D is an
authoritative interpretation of article III).
165. Smith, Ex-Secretaries Urge Adherence to ABM Pact, Wash. Post, Mar. 10,
1987, at A7, col. 4.
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while at times ambiguous, favors the traditional view.
As a matter of policy, an attempt to manipulate the ABM Treaty's
restrictions is a dubious tactic. The ABM Treaty, as traditionally inter-
preted, has helped prevent nuclear war for fifteen years. It has also
avoided an expensive defensive weapons arms race. The United States
abandonment of the ABM Treaty's limitations may encourage the So-
viet Union to abandon portions of the Treaty that are inconvenient for
it. The Reagan administration is willing to accept these risks in order
to allow for development and testing of an SDI plan that may never
become reality.
There are also major political ramifications attached to the reinter-
pretation. Should subsequent administrations maintain the position in
support of the reinterpretation, the current ABM Treaty will likely dis-
integrate and it is difficult to conceive of the Soviet Union agreeing to
another treaty. Additionally, the rest of the world may conclude that
the United States has violated an international agreement and there-
fore violated international law. A violation of the Treaty sets a poor
example by a superpower that otherwise portrays itself as committed to
the struggle for a stable international legal order.
Rather than reinterpreting the ABM Treaty, the United States
should continue researching SDI without progressing into the develop-
ment and testing stage until definitive evidence is obtained proving
SDI's effectiveness and survivability. If such evidence is discovered, the
United States could then make an informed decision as to whether pur-
suing SDI is worth the cost of abandoning the ABM Treaty. Addition-
ally, at that time the United States could reopen discussions with the
Soviet Union concerning ABM limitations pursuant to Agreed State-
ment D. This would enable the United States to protect its domestic
interests while remaining in compliance with the ABM Treaty and in-
ternational law.
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